



R A U L P R E B I S C H 
Technical Editor 
A D O L F O G U R R I E R I 
Deputy Secretary 
G R E G O R I O W E I N B E R G 
U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
SANTIAGO, CHILE / DECEMBER 1981 
CEPAL 
Review 
Number 15 Santiago, Chile December 1981 
CONTENTS 
Development and equity. The challenge of the 1980s 
Enrique V. Iglesias 7 
Problems and orientations of development 
CEPAL Economic Projections Centre 47 
Consumption in the new Latin American models 
Carlos Filgueira 71 
Some reflections on South-East Asian export industrialization 
Fernando Fajnzylber 111 
T h e development strategy and employment in the 1980s 
Víctor E. Tokman 133 
T h e concept of integration 
Isaac Cohen Orantes 143 
Dialogue on Friedman and Hayek. From the standpoint of the periphery 
Raúl Prebisch 153 
Some CEPAL publications 175 
C E P A L REVIEW 
December 1981 
Dialogue on 
Friedman and Hayek 
From the standpoint of 
the periphery 
Raul Prebisch* 
In all his recent writings, the author has maintained 
that neoclassical thinking is not only incapable of 
explaining the structure and operation of capitalism 
in the periphery, but has a misguiding influence on 
economic policy decisions. In the present article he 
reverts to these ideas, formulating them as if they 
came up in the course oí a dialogue carried out with 
followers of the two leading contemporary mentors 
of the thinking in question; thus he is able to present 
his points of view with the fluid simplicity in which 
strictly academic essays are often lacking. 
In his opinion, the root cause of the incapacity of 
neoclassical thinking to interpret peripheral 
capitalism lies above all in its failure to take into 
consideration the economic surplus, which is the 
hub of this system's basic characteristics. It disre-
gards the structural heterogeneity which possibili-
t i e s the existence of the surplus; it bypasses the 
structure and dynamics of power which explain how 
the surplus is appropriated and shared out; it shuts 
its eyes to the monetary mechanism of production 
which allows the surplus to be retained by the upper 
strata; and it underestimates the waste involved in 
the ways in which the surplus is currently used. 
This shortsighted interpretation of the eco-
nomic process predisposes neoclassical thinking to 
propose policy measures which do not succeed in 
promoting the development of the periphery, which 
increase and consolidate social inequality and which 
necessitate the establishment of authoritarian re-
gimes, diametrically at variance with the ideas of 
democratic liberalism. The necessary transforma-
tion of peripheral capitalism, which the author pro-
pounds , must preserve the values and institutions of 
democracy and at the same time ensure vigorous 
economic development and equitable distribution 
of its fruits. 
*Director of the CEPAL Review, 
I 
The ideas of Milton 
Friedman 
1. Their broad outlines 
T h e swing of the ideological pendulum has 
now brought neoclassicism freshly to the fore, 
and to Milton Friedman belongs the merit of 
be ing its supreme disseminator. For some time 
past I had been reading his various studies, 
without, however, finding his arguments and 
propositions at all convincing, until the appear-
ance of his book Free to Choose, written in 
collaboration with Mrs. Friedman. I felt drawn 
to read it, since it presumably constituted a 
complete presentation of the eminent econ-
omist's ideas. I carefully perused its pages, pre-
pared to revise my original opinions, but I must 
confess that what I read still failed to convince 
me; rather did it strengthen my frankly critical 
position. 
I recognize, however, that the book is ad-
mirable for its limpid clarity and persuasive 
force: and also for its frequent recourse to con-
crete illustration and example. I fully under-
stand its power of penetration. Milton Fried-
man indeed offers us straightforward and sim-
ple solutions to the disquieting problems of the 
economic world: let the forces of the economy 
have free play, get rid of the restrictions with 
which enterprises and workers distort their op-
eration, do away with tariff protection and the 
other hindrances to the international division 
of labour, and we shall see prosperity and dis-
tributive justice springing up on every side. No 
brakes on economic activity, but the growth of 
the State does need curbing: a constitutional 
limit to it must be established. And ceilings 
must also be set to the monetary expansion 
which has led to chronic and disruptive in-
flation, 
How can one fail to be captivated by the 
doctrine of an economist who, over and above 
the merit referred to, has seen his academic 
distinction crowned with the award of the 
Nobel Prize, which has likewise been received 
by Dr. von Hayek, of whom we shall also be 
speaking? 
The Chicago professor has innumerable 
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adherents : I have met with many of them in our 
countries and, above all, among the younger 
generations who are leaving the United States 
universities, especially the one in which 
Milton Friedman lectures. And I have often 
had a chance to talk with some of them, al-
though not all —they are too numerous for that. 
Moreover, there are some among them who, 
deeply convinced of an incontrovertible truth, 
do not deign even to enter into discussion with 
any who profess different ideas. But there 
are others, and no small number to be sure, who 
do find discussion acceptable, prompted 
perhaps by certain insidious doubts that arise 
out of their other readings. 
With these latter, too, I frequently have the 
opportunity of maintaining a dialogue; rather 
ought I to say the privilege, for dialogue with 
those who have something to say or to ask I 
always find stimulating, so much so that I felt it 
should be reflected in these pages. To repro-
duce it meticulously would be tedious, since 
the same arguments crop up again and again; I 
have therefore tried to extract their essential 
points and expound them with a measure of 
orderliness which is not always practicable in 
the animated course of several conversations. 
In doing so I have thought it fitting not to con-
fine myself to a strictly academic critique, but 
to adopt the same diffusive tone that 
characterizes the above-mentioned book by 
Milton Friedman. 
In presenting the main outlines of the 
dialogue, I hope to reach the many who are 
anxious to clarify their own thinking in face of 
the serious world crisis through which we are 
passing. 
Before embarking upon the discussions, I 
thought I ought to check the correctness of my 
interpretation of the content of Milton 
Fr iedman's essential thinking, which in my 
opinion could be summarized as follows: 
— The free play of market forces, unimpeded 
by any interference whatsoever in a fully com-
peti t ive system, leads to the optimum alloca-
tion of the factors of production and to the re-
munerat ion of these factors in accordance with 
their contribution to the production process; 
— For this to happen, an indispensable requi-
site is to prevent restrictions on free competi-
tion. Restrictions which take the form both of 
combinations on the part of enterprises to raise 
prices and combinations on the part of the 
labour force to increase wages; 
— The State must adopt an absolutely laissez-
faire policy, although it is recognized that 
something must be done to alleviate the un-
happy lot of those who in the play of competi-
tion are left at the bottom of the system. Hence 
the negative tax (to avoid the term subsidy) 
proposed by Milton Friedman; 
— Lastly, inflation must be curbed by regulat-
ing the creation of money and preventing the 
fiscal deficit from which it stems. Hence too the 
inescapable necessity of limiting the growth of 
public expenditure. 
I must warn readers that I have confined 
myself to considering the foregoing points 
without going into other issues with which sci-
entific criticism usually deals, such as the na-
ture and behaviour of the economic agents and 
certain assumptions relating to the operation of 
the market. 
Without depreciating Milton Friedman's 
proselytizing effort, I contend that there is no 
question of new ideas, but of intelligent diffu-
sion of the neoclassical thinking formulated 
dur ing the second half of the nineteenth 
century. As far as I myself am concerned, I 
confess that I too drew sustenance from that 
doctrine, and taught it as a young university 
professor in the 1920s. In those days I even 
translated a little book in Italian by a brilliant 
disciple of Vilfredo Pareto, which contained a 
lucid exposition of the theory of general 
equilibrium.1 
Well, everything is to be found in those 
neoclassical texts, including the idea of a sub-
sidy for the poor, and also the proposal to limit 
the creation of money in circulation which de-
rives from the old and much-debated quantita-
tive theory of money. 
In reality, one cannot but be surprised at 
the dogmatic persistence of certain ideas, such 
as these in defence of capitalism, as well as 
others of an opposite tendency which also 
emerged in the second half of the last century. 
This intellectual stagnation, at least as regards 
•i refer to Enrico Barone and his book Principios de 
economía. 
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development , seems very odd indeed in com-
parison with the impressive evolution of the 
other scientific disciplines. What has hap-
p e n e d ? 
I have not the slightest doubt that what 
lies behind this ideological pertinacity is the 
sometimes formidable pressure of certain in-
terests. I do not mean that the original ideas 
underlying the major theories of neoclassicism 
s temmed from such interests, nor that this ac-
counts for the dogmatic stubbornness of some 
of their adherents today. In their time the neo-
classical theories signified a great stride for-
ward in the scientific area, above all by virtue of 
their precision and their mathematical ele-
gance; but their perpetuation is largely due to 
the interplay of interests. 
Thus, the theory of the international divi-
sion of labour, which CEPAL began to criticize 
in its earliest publications thirty years ago, was 
entirely responsive to the interests of the great 
centres and of the upper strata in the Latin 
American periphery. It seems astonishing that 
the aim now should be to return to it and, as 
regards development, put back the clock. Simi-
larly, the play of interests explains the fervour 
with which certain social groups in our 
countries cling to Milton Friedman's doctrine, 
inasmuch as it repudiates the disturbing action 
of trade-union movements. What is more, in the 
name of the freedom of the market the doors are 
opened to the transnational corporations, 
which are not exactly the most genuine expres-
sion of free competition. 
This is why the propagation of neoclassi-
cism has at the present moment the impressive 
backing of the United States television, which, 
with great skill in driving home its message, 
broadcasts far and wide over Latin America 
certain ideologies whose dissemination is not 
usually inspired by an authentically scientific 
purpose. 
After these initial remarks, we will now 
embark upon the dialogue. I shall refer to the 
lack of congruity between the neoclassical 
theories and the realities of the periphery. As 
regards their significance in the centres, de-
vastating criticisms exist, and this is not the 
place to dwell on them. We will first discuss 
Milton Friedman and then Dr. von Hayek. 
They could have been taken together, since 
there is so much that is coincident in their writ-
ings, bu t I prefer to devote special attention to 
the latter towards the end of the present article, 
whe re I examine in particular his conception of 
the State and liberty. 
2. Market laws 
First and foremost I want to refer to a passage 
which condenses Milton Friedman's ideas on 
the virtues of the market. It draws its inspira-
tion from the work of Adam Smith, the well-
spring of neoclassical thinking. Our authors 
say: 
"Adam Smith's flash of genius was his rec-
ognition that the prices that emerged from vol-
untary transactions between buyers and sellers 
—for short, in a free market— could co-ordinate 
the activity of millions of people, each seeking 
his own interest, in such a way as to make 
everyone better off. It was a startling idea then, 
and it remains one today, that economic order 
can emerge as the unintended consequence of 
the actions of many people, each seeking his 
own interest. 
"The price system works so well, so ef-
ficiently, that we are not aware of it most of the 
t ime. We never realize how well it functions 
unti l it is prevented from functioning, and even 
then we seldom recognize the source of the 
trouble".2 
Later they add: 
"Prices perform three functions in organiz-
ing economic activity: first, they transmit infor-
mation; second, they provide an incentive to 
adopt those methods of production that are 
least costly and thereby use available resources 
for the most highly valued purposes; third, they 
determine who gets how much of the product 
—the distribution of income. These three func-
tions are closely interrelated".3 
And on income distribution they make the 
following comment: 
"There has been an attempt to separate 
this function of the price system —distributing 
income— from its other functions —trans-
mitting information and providing incentives. 
2Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose. A 
Personal Statement, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York 
and London, 1980, pp. 13-14. 
¿Ibid., p. 14. 
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Much government activity during recent de-
cades in the United States and other countries 
that rely predominantly on the market has been 
directed at altering the distribution of income 
generated by the market in order to produce a 
different and more equal distribution of in-
come. There is a strong current of opinion pres-
sing for still further steps in this direction".4 
The perusal of these pages is the starting-
point of our dialogue. And in the give-and-take 
of this dialogue a question that almost always 
arises is the following: 
— Why do you object to these ideas which 
Milton Friedman presents so clearly? 
— Before putting forward my objections, let 
me ask you a question so as to be sure of under-
standing your interpretation. What do you 
think is the modus operandi of Adam Smith's 
'invisible hand', whereby the economic in-
terest of individuals leads the way to solutions 
which benefit the entire community? 
— To us it is obvious. The individual en-
trepreneur, impelled by the profit incentive, 
introduces technical innovations which step 
up productivity and reduce costs. This has two 
consequences: in the first place, it induces him 
to increase production so as to make larger 
profits; and secondly, in a régime of free com-
petition, other entrepreneurs take pains to do 
the same. In this way production expands, 
with the concomitant fall in prices. In other 
words, to adopt the terms you use in your 
studies, the fruits of technical progress are 
transferred to the consumers. And the 
tendency is to reach a position of equilibrium 
in which profits disappear, and all that re-
mains is the entrepreneurs' remuneration for 
the work they do and the risk they have run. In 
our opinion, this argument is incontrovertible. 
Don't you think so? 
— Undoubtedly it is from the standpoint of 
individual enterprises. But let us look at the 
matter from the angle of the dynamics of overall 
growth. Would you be prepared to do so? 
— Of course. The whole is the sum of the 
parts, and if this is so, why should not the 
tendency to equilibrium be evinced likewise? 
— I think we have come to a very important 
4lbid.,p.23. 
point. According to you this tendency is man-
ifested in an increase in supply which brings 
down prices until they are equal to costs. But 
the increase in supply is not instantaneous. The 
production process takes a certain time, from 
the stage of producing raw material up to the 
appearance of the finished good on the market. 
During this process, the purpose of which is to 
produce future goods, enterprises pay out to 
the labour force higher incomes than those paid 
out before, and these constitute the cost of the 
supply of today's goods. Is that so? 
— Agreed, although that is a highly simplified 
argument. 
— Very well. I could make it more comp-
licated, if you wish, albeit I do not think it 
necessary. I will go on. From these incomes 
that the entrepreneurs pay out in the course of 
the production process stems consumer de-
mand. In the case of a single enterprise, this 
demand is spread out thinly over the whole 
breadth of the market; and it has only a 
negligibe bearing on the final goods produced 
by the enterprise under consideration. Accord-
ingly, there is no reason why it should affect the 
tendency towards equilibrium which you post-
ulate. But when, on the other hand, account is 
taken of the overall growth which characterizes 
development, it is different matter. 
— Why should it be different if we are dealing 
with the sum of the parts, that is, the whole 
body of enterprises? 
— For a very simple reason. When the whole 
body of enterprises is concerned, the rise in the 
incomes that stem from the expanding produc-
tion in process increases the global demand 
which extends to all goods, although in widely 
varying degrees. But obviously the goods in 
question are not those still in the making, i.e., 
tomorrow's goods which in due course will re-
sult from the production in process, but those 
which form today's supply. The demand of 
which we are speaking derives from incomes 
which, as I have just said, are higher than those 
contained in the cost of the goods in which the 
present supply consists. 
It is this greater demand that allows the 
fruits of the productivity increment to be ab-
sorbed without a fall in prices. 
Bear it in mind that this increased demand 
finds expression through the creation of money 
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by the bank system, and when the supply of 
final goods comes on to the market, the en-
terprises recover not only the money they paid 
out previously to obtain that supply, but also 
the additional money with which they pay out 
the incomes corresponding to the current ex-
pansion of the production in process. Accord-
ingly, this additional money reverts to the en-
terprises in the form of profits, and thus they 
can appropriate the fruits of increasing 
productivity. 
I would ask you to reflect that we are con-
sidering a dynamic phenomenon, a phenome-
non of expanding production, which would not 
occur in a static situation. 
— / / we have understood you aright, in this 
dynamic phenomenon great importance 
attaches to the expansion of income and de-
mand:, with the consequent monetary 
expansion. 
— Yes, indeed, otherwise price levels could 
not be maintained. You wouldn't find such an 
explanation in neoclassical theories. In these 
theories the phenomenon in question is at-
t r ibuted to market imperfections. Therefore, if 
prices do not fall in spite of the increase in 
productivity, the reason is that they are pre-
vented from doing so by monopolistic or 
oligopolistic combinations on the part of 
enterprises. 
Neoclassical theory does not take into con-
sideration the monetary expansion which ac-
companies the growth of the production in pro-
cess. If there were no such expansion, prices 
would fall as productivity improved. And if 
they were prevented from falling by the en-
terprises ' combinations, there would be less 
d e m a n d for other goods, and the price decline 
would exceed the productivity increment; in 
other words, prices would drop below the cost 
of production, which would be an untenable 
position. Believe me, there can be no explana-
tion of this phenomenon if the expansion of 
income and money in a dynamic situation is 
disregarded. 
However, this neoclassical reasoning, 
notwithstanding the flaw I have mentioned, 
has had the merit of making some adherents of 
neoclassicism in the periphery acknowledge 
the existence of great disparities in income dis-
tribution. Until not long ago they expected that 
these disparities would gradually be corrected. 
Now they recognize that this has not happened, 
and agree that they do exist, as was pointed out 
to me by Norberto González.5 That is a step 
forward! 
All this constitutes one of the major issues 
discussed in my latest book.6 I hope that the 
present very succinct explanation of the 
phenomenon concerned may have enabled you 
to appreciate its significance. 
— We find your explanations interesting, and 
should like to think them over thoroughly. You 
maintain that the growth of demand in the 
course of the production in process makes it 
possible to absorb the supply of final goods 
without a fall in prices by virtue of the pro-
ductivity increment. And that enterprises are 
thus enabled to garner the fruits of productiv-
ity in the shape of profits. But this does not 
preclude the system's tending towards 
equilibrium, with the consequent elimination 
of profits in accordance with neoclassical 
reasoning. Equilibrium might be reached in 
another way that you have not considered. 
— I am still very far from having considered all 
the variables. But what would be this other way 
of reaching equilibrium in the system? 
— You have referred to prices but not to the 
wages of the labour force. Let us suppose that 
prices do not fall. But the incentive of larger 
profits induces enterprises to expand produc-
tion, for which purpose they need to increase 
employment. Enterprises thus compete with 
one another to recruit this additional man-
power. And this competition has the virtue of 
raising wages at the expense of profits. Hence 
there is a tendency towards equilibrium. Con-
sequently, if it may correctly be asserted that 
profits do not disappear because prices de-
cline, they will be wiped out in the end by 
virtue of the increase in remunerations, inc-
luding the remuneration of entrepreneurs. 
— T h e argument you put before me is not 
without its logic. But in real-life conditions in 
the periphery this is not how things happen. 
T h e neoclassical theories take no note of the 
•''Deputy Executive Secretary of CEPAL. 
^Capitalismo periférico. Crisis y transformación, 
Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981, 
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social structure of the periphery and the con-
tinual changes it undergoes. It is a heterogene-
ous social structure in which great disparities 
in productivity are found; while, on the one 
hand, part of the labour force is employed in 
jobs using high-productivity techniques, on the 
other hand there are masses of human beings 
working at very low levels of productivity. And 
be tween the two extremes stretches a wide 
range of varying techniques and productivities. 
This structural heterogeneity is of considerable 
importance, since the labour force which in the 
dynamics of development is gradually ab-
sorbed at high levels of productivity, thanks to 
capital accumulation, does not improve its in-
come correlatively with that productivity in the 
free play of market forces. It is prevented from 
doing so by competition on the part of the broad 
masses of workers from the lower social strata 
who are left behind in the lower-productivity 
layers of technology. A regressive competition 
takes place which makes it impossible to im-
prove remunerations commensurately with the 
system's rising productivity. Do you under-
stand this structural phenomenon? 
— We think we understand it, but it does not 
altogether convince us, for it seems to us that 
this maladjustment between productivity and 
wages is a temporary phenomenon which will 
also tend to disappear. In other words, the 
system's tendency towards equilibrium will 
take longer to operate, but will end by gaining 
the day. 
— Well, I realize that your faith in the neoclas-
sical theory of equilibrium is unassailable. Pos-
sibly you trust that a steady increase in capital 
accumulation will mean that more and more 
workers are absorbed, at higher and higher 
rates of pay, owing to the productivity incre-
ment , and that all this will come about at the 
expense of the enterprises' profits. In this way 
the system will approach its position of 
equil ibrium. It would then be a matter of time... 
— Exactly. Such, in our opinion, is the 
tendency of the system if it is undisturbed by 
any form of interference, that is, if the econ-
omic system functions unhampered, if market 
forces operate freely. Therein lies the great 
significance of neoclassical reasoning. Can 
you deny it? 
— That would be the case if the dynamics of 
the system worked out as you think. But un-
fortunately this is not what happens. Unfortu-
nately, I say, because if it were to happen, the 
major problems with which we are faced could 
be spontaneously resolved. And I should be-
come a Friedmanite! 
— We will continue to follow what you say 
with close attention, so as to understand so 
downright a statement. 
3. The dynamics of the economic surplus 
— Well, at this stage in our dialogue I shall 
introduce the concept of the economic surplus. 
As a first approximation, which will suffice for 
the time being, we may assume that the surplus 
is identifiable with the profits of enterprises. I 
refer you to my book if you are interested in this 
point, and will concentrate for now on the econ-
omic surplus, which is of profound dynamic 
significance. 
Keep the concept well in mind. The surp-
lus represents that part of successive productiv-
ity increments which is not transferred to the 
labour force because of the heterogeneity of the 
social structure and because of the regressive 
competition mentioned above. The owners of 
the enterprises' means of production ap-
propriate the surplus and retain it thanks to the 
continuous expansion of demand. The surplus 
represents a combination of a structural pheno-
menon and a dynamic phenomenon. 
— 1 am afraid you are deflecting us from our 
line of argument. Giving profits a change of 
name and talking of the surplus does not mean 
that this latter will not tend to decrease until it 
disappears as the result of active competition 
among enterprises. 
— Please have patience with me. Given the 
nature of the system, the economic surplus 
must continually increase. That is a dynamic 
requirement of the system; and it is so because 
the surplus —and everything pertaining to it— 
is the source of a major proportion of the en-
terprises ' reproductive capital accumulation. If 
the system is to develop and employment and 
productivity are to increase, ceaseless growth 
of the surplus is indispensable. 
The surplus serves, however, not only for 
accumulation but also for consumption. The 
fact is that much of it is increasingly allocated to 
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the privileged consumption of the upper strata 
of the social structure in whose hands most of 
the means of production are concentrated. And 
this is detrimental to the intensity of accumula-
tion. T h e same thing happens in the case of the 
excessive siphoning-off of peripheral income 
by the centres. And this insufficient accumula-
tion has a weakening effect on the absorption of 
the lower strata; that is, it brings in its train the 
exclusive tendency of the system. 
— But what you have just said does not neces-
sarily occur. Suppose the surplus were used 
intensively for accumulation purposes, as well 
as the income siphoned-off by the centres. In 
that case, the period of transition towards 
equilibrium would be much shorter, but 
equilibrium would be reached in any event. 
— Don ' t think I am just being obstinate, but 
this is now how things turn out. To prove it, let 
m e revert to the surplus. 
I was speaking earlier of the dynamic 
necessity of continually increasing the surplus. 
I t increases thanks to constant productivity in-
crements . Now, as the labour force acquires 
more and more spontaneous ability to share in 
the fruits of productivity, the growth rate of the 
surplus and therefore of reproductive capital 
accumulation is adversely affected. 
Thus , let us assume that a time comes 
w h e n improvements in wages absorb the 
whole of the productivity increment. But the 
global surplus would then have attained its 
h ighes t level. And in accordance with the line 
of reasoning you have been following, competi-
t ion among enterprises in order to obtain more 
and more labour to expand production would 
compel them to raise wages progressively until 
in the end the surplus disappeared. The sub-
stantiation of neoclassical reasoning would in 
this way lead to a sort of euthanasia of the 
surplus. 
— Which shows that the neoclassical postu-
late of equilibrium is correct, as we were 
saying. 
— It would be correct if this was indeed the 
way in which things worked out. But matters 
follow a very different course. Remember that 
the surplus is the wellspring of capital accumu-
lation. And if it is gradually reduced by the 
growing competition among enterprises to ob-
tain additional labour, capital accumulation 
will increasingly suffer. The consequences 
would be very serious, since employment and 
production would decline, and an economic 
contraction would supervene. 
— Be it so. But therein might lie the solution 
of the problem. Contraction and unemploy-
ment would bring down wages, which had in-
creased inordinately, to the detriment of ac-
cumulation. And this adjustment, however dis-
tressful for the time being, has the merit of 
reducing wages until the surplus is re-
established, its dynamics is restored and, 
therefore, the growth of accumulation and em-
ployment is renewed. 
— Well and good. But think what you are argu-
ing. If a contraction is necessary in order to 
allow the surplus to start growing again, that 
means that the tendency towards equilibrium 
which you assume does not in fact operate. It 
does not operate, because the surplus increases 
again thanks to the fall in wages. To reach 
equil ibrium it would be essential for the sur-
plus to be wiped out. 
— Allow us a moment's reflection. The fact 
that the surplus decreases does not necessarily 
mean that accumulation stops growing. Other 
patterns are possible; for example, as accumu-
lation on the part of those who appropriated 
the surplus weakens, it may be the labour force 
itself that accumulates capital as wages rise. 
So the dynamics of the system would function 
without interruption. 
— Agreed. But there is nothing in the sponta-
neous play of the system which leads the labour 
force to accumulate instead of the upper strata. 
In reality it would have to accumulate more 
in order to correct the exclusive tendency of the 
system. But this is not how the system works. 
D o you suppose that enterprises would look 
on unmoved at the spectacle of their returns 
falling while wages rose? And assuming that 
they did so, what would happen if the labour 
force increased its own consumption instead of 
accumulating? 
— Obviously the dynamics of the system 
could not continue to operate. But in that case, 
the responsibility would have to be laid not on 
the privileged consumption of the upper 
strata, but on the consumption of the labour 
force. 
— That is not the point at issue. It is not a 
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question of responsibilities, but of the way in 
which the system functions. The system does 
not bring about its own transformation. It is 
what it is... 
— We find so sweeping an assertion discon-
certing; we should like you to explain your 
ideas to us more fully. 
— Once again I assert that the system can func-
tion regularly only while the heretogeneity of 
the social structure, the great disparities in pro-
ductivity, permit the ceaseless growth of the 
surplus. If capital accumulation were highly 
intensive and great dynamism characterized 
the absorption of the labour force, a time would 
come when the surplus began to decrease be-
cause of competition among enterprises. And 
then the aforesaid fundamental dynamic re-
qui rement would not be fulfilled and contrac-
tion would supervene. Which means that the 
dynamics of the system is founded on social 
inequality and that this cannot be remedied 
beyond a certain point. 
— Yet this crisis of the system would appear to 
occur when reproductive capital accumula-
tion is very vigorous. If it were not, the absorp-
tion of labour would necessarily be less inten-
sive, and then the crisis would be warded off. 
— Undoubtedly, the crisis would be warded 
off if another very important factor did not in-
tervene. But if this were the case, you had bet-
ter forget about the tendency of the system to 
reach a position of equilibrium in which the 
incomes of the factors correspond to their con-
tribution to the production process. Do you 
acknowledge this? 
— We should like to give thorough considera-
tion to what you have said before expressing an 
opinion. In the meantime, to what other factor 
are you referring? 
4. Trade-union power and the crisis of the 
system 
— I am about to explain it. The labour force 
does not wait until, in the course of time, 
perhaps a very long time, its redi stribu tive 
power with respect to the surplus is spontane-
ously strengthened. The changes in the social 
structure which occur in the course of develop-
men t are accompanied by the growth of the 
trade-union and political power of the labour 
force. It is a power that increasingly coun-
terpoises the power of the owners of the means 
of production to appropriate the surplus. Thus, 
whi le it is true that wages do not spontaneously 
improve correlatively with the productivity in-
crement, owing to the insufficiency of capital 
accumulation, the improvement in question is 
secured thanks to the trade-union and political 
power of the labour force, in so far as the demo-
cratization process develops unhampered in 
the course of the aforesaid structural changes. 
— But in that case it would be the evolution of 
trade-union and political power which would 
end, in our opinion, by driving the system to its 
crisis. Milton Friedman would then be 
perfectly right in impugning trade-union 
power. Could you read us the relevant 
paragraphs? 
— Here they are. This is what they say: 
"Unions of highly skilled workers have un-
questionably been able to raise the wages of 
their members; however, people who would in 
any event be highly paid are in a favourable 
position to form strong unions. Moreover, the 
ability of unions to raise the wages of some 
workers does not mean that universal unionism 
could raise the wages of all workers. On the 
contrary, and this is a fundamental source of 
misunderstanding, the gains that strong un-
ions win for their members are primarily at the 
expense of other workers. (Italicized in the 
original text.) 
"The key to understanding the situation is 
the most elementary principle of economics: 
the law of demand —the higher the price of 
anything, the less of it people will be willing to 
by... 
"A successful union reduces the number of 
jobs available of the kind it controls. As a result, 
some peopie who would like to get such jobs at 
the union wage cannot do so. They are forced to 
look elsewhere. A greater supply of workers for 
other jobs drives down the wages paid for those 
jobs. Universal unionization would not alter 
the situation. It could mean higher wages for 
the persons who get jobs, along with more un-
employment for others. More likely, it would 
mean strong unions and weak unions, with 
members of the strong unions getting higher 
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wages, as they do now, at the expense of mem-
bers of weak unions."7 
— As you see, Milton Friedman, like other 
neoclassicists, abominates trade-union power. 
He considers it to be an arbitrary power. He 
takes no account whatever of the arbitrariness 
of the appropriation of the surplus. In view of 
this power of appropriation, the labour force 
resorts to its own redistributive power to secure 
an ever-larger share in the fruits of the system's 
increasing productivity. First those that are 
best organized, as Milton Friedman says, and 
afterwards the less well organized, availing 
themselves of their political power. 
Milton Friedman condemns trade-union 
power because, in his opinion, it implies a vio-
lation of market laws. He would be right if 
these laws, in a régime of free competition, 
were to spread the fruits of increasing pro-
ductivity. But I have explained that this does 
not happen: the fruits in question are retained 
in the guise of the surplus and, in order to share 
in them, the labour force resorts to its trade-
union and political power. What is involved, 
therefore, is a conflict of powers. 
— This conflict of powers, however, accord-
ing to your own writings, leads to the social 
inflation which has increasingly disturbing ef-
fects on the system. 
— That is so. I have tried to demonstrate in my 
theoretical arguments that this happens even if 
unrestricted competition reigns, and even if 
State expenditure is marked by the moderation 
that Milton Friedman recommends. 
— But moderation is hardly a characteristic 
of the State, and Milton Friedman maintains 
that this is a primary factor of inflation. I be-
lieve you yourself recognize it. 
— I have recognized it for a long time past. The 
State's responsibility for inflation is heavy, not 
only when it incurs a chronic deficit, but when 
it covers all its expenditure with taxation. 
When expenditure is excessive, as generally 
happens, taxes tend to become inflationary. 
This does not occur in those phases of develop-
ment in which the labour force is still lacking in 
trade-union and political power. But once it 
acquires this power, it tries to recoup itself for 
7Miiton and Rose Friedman, op. cit., pp. 233 and 234. 
the taxes and other burdens that fall on its 
shoulders. And it does so by pushing up its 
wages and at the expense of the growth of the 
economic surplus. So two elements are com-
bined in the system's march towards crisis: the 
genuine endeavour of the labour force to im-
prove its situation, and its efforts to recoup it-
self for the taxes and charges that erode its 
income. You should take it into consideration 
that there are also taxes and charges which bear 
directly upon the surplus and whose effects 
intensify the process I have just explained. 
— We think we are beginning to understand 
you. According to what you are saying, a 
twofold pressure is exerted on the surplus: that 
of the labour force and that of the State 
through the labour force. And this twofold 
pressure tends to make for a crisis through its 
adverse effects on capital accumulation, emp-
loyment and the global product. 
— I am glad to hear you say this... The pressure 
is not twofold, however, but threefold. Don't 
forget the internal pressure on the surplus: the 
pressure of privileged consumption. If those 
who appropriate the surplus practised austerity 
and used their accumulation potential to the 
utmost, we might talk of twofold pressure. But 
peripheral capitalism is not characterized by 
austerity. And the crisis is reached precisely 
when this threefold pressure prevents the con-
tinued growth of accumulation. 
— There is an aspect of the question which is 
still not clear to us, and which we would ask 
you to explain. Why does inflation necessarily 
occur? 
— Simply because when the surplus de-
creases not only is the profitability of enter-
prises weakened, but at the same time capital 
accumulation suffers, the rate of absorption of 
the labour force slows down and unemploy-
ment and a contraction in economic activity 
supervene. You will realize that so precarious a 
situation cannot last very long. And the only 
way out for the enterprises is to raise prices so 
as to re-establish the dynamics of the surplus, 
with the consequent capital accumulation, and 
when the labour force has sufficient trade-
union and political power, the rise in prices is 
followed by a further wage increase. And so in 
succession. Thus a continuous and ever-
widening inflationary spiral is triggered off. 
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— You describe the spiral as ever-widening. 
Surely if that is true it is due to the tolerance of 
the monetary authority. That is why we attach 
great importance to Milton Friedman s recom-
mendation that a strict limit be fixed to the 
creation of money. 
— Take care! You are treading on very thin 
ice. In face of the phenomena we are discus-
sing, which are different from those of the past, 
monetary policy proves not only incapable of 
containing the inflationary spiral, but also 
counterproductive. Let me explain why I make 
so categorical an assertion. 
Remember what I said on the expansion of 
the production in process and of the need to 
create money in order to pay out the steadily 
increasing incomes which it entails. Now, if the 
monetary authority refuses to enlarge the flow 
of money needed by the enterprises to pay 
these higher wages, what will the enterprises 
do in face oftrade-union pressure? They cannot 
he lp but use part of that flow of money to meet 
wage increases. And in proceeding thus they 
must necessarily reduce the amount of money 
that they ought to have earmarked for the ex-
pansion of production. So the rate of production 
in process slackens or contracts —according to 
the degree of intensity of the monetary restric-
tion. This is a phenomenon that used not occur 
before: namely, higher wages and prices on the 
one hand, and on the other hand a contraction 
of production and employment. Do you follow 
me? 
— Your reasoning is clear; but we must take a 
look at what happens afterwards. Don't you 
think that in the end unemployment will un-
dermine trade-union and political power, 
bring down wages and ultimately contain the 
rise in prices, thus doing away with the spiral? 
— Unless trade-union and political power is 
repressed by the State I do not think that what 
you say will happen. But let us assume for a 
moment that it does; let us suppose the power 
in question has been dissolved by virtue of the 
use of force by the State. The monetary author-
ity will then be able to pursue an expansionist 
policy in order to encourage the recovery of the 
economy. Unemployment will be remedied 
and the labour force will renew the struggle to 
regain former wage levels and later improve 
upon them. Thus the distribution struggle will 
enter upon a new cycle, unless trade-union and 
political repression continues. 
Can the devotees of Milton Friedman go 
on talking, then, of political liberty and the 
regulatory efficiency of the market through 
economic liberty? 
— Are you impugning the market as well? 
— Not at all. A sharp distinction needs to be 
drawn between the market and the regulatory 
virtue attributed to it. A close look must be 
taken at the social structure that lies behind the 
market, the changes that occur in it, and the 
play of power relations which is the outcome of 
all this. The market in itself is an efficacious 
mechanism, and has great political signifi-
cance. But we must not expect of the market 
what it simply cannot give. 
As I have already explained, the heter-
ogeneity of the social structure enables the up-
per strata, chiefly, to appropriate the econ-
omic surplus as the production technology 
of the centres penetrates into the periphery. 
And since they do not use it as fully as possible 
for reproductive capital accumulation, in view 
of their privileged consumption, insufficient 
accumulation makes it impossible for the lower 
strata that are relegated to the bottom of the 
social structure to be absorbed at rising levels 
of productivity, a state of affairs which is ag-
gravated by the population explosion. In the 
same connexion I have mentioned the 
siphoning-off of income by the centres. None of 
these deficiencies can be spontaneously cor-
rected by the market. 
—You also frequently allude to the hyper-
trophy of the State that militates against 
accumulation, a point on which there would 
seem to be some coincidence of views with 
Milton Friedman. 
— With a great difference, however. For this 
hypertrophy is largely due to the dynamic flaws 
in the system, to its insufficient labour-
absorbent capacity and to the arbitrary ap-
propriation of the fruits of technical progress. 
T h e State performs a labour-absorbent func-
tion, especially in the middle strata. But it 
performs it badly, because what is involved is 
partly a spurious absorption of manpower 
which is really not needed. Moreover, the vari-
ous social services provided by the State are 
justified largely by the system's great distribu-
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tive disparities. But this is not all. The State is 
also a reflection of changing power relations, 
not excluding, of course, the influence of milit-
ary power on its expenditure. And, further-
more, it is very far from efficient in its opera-
tion. Rather than State hypertrophy, we ought 
to speak of State obesity, which prevents it from 
fulfilling its functions with briskness and 
efficiency. 
5. The allocation of resources 
— Your were saying that the market is in itself 
an efficacious mechanism. Do you recognize 
this efficacy with respect to the allocation of 
productive resources? 
— I would recognize it if the problem of ac-
cumulation and that of the great structural dis-
parities in income distribution, which must be 
distinguished from functional disparities, were 
resolved outside the market —I stress the 
words 'outside the market'. The allocation of 
resources would then be correct, but even so it 
must be borne in mind that the market inhe-
rently lacks not only a social horizon, but also 
an extensive time horizon, and it must be 
guided with foresight. This lack of foresight 
implicit in the play of market laws we are wit-
nessing now in certain dramatic manifestations 
of the ambivalence of technology. I am refer-
ring to the irresponsible exploitation of non-
renewable natural resources and to en-
vironmental deterioration. Do you think that in 
this case market laws have led to rational allo-
cation of the factors of production? 
— Of course not; that would be to ignore the 
evidence of facts itself. But there can he no 
doubt that the market makes it possible to cor-
rect these flaws through the price system, as 
Milton Friedman has also pointed out. 
— I acknowledge that the price system offers a 
good solution, always provided that certain es-
sential measures are deliberately adopted. Un-
questionably, the rise in petroleum prices will 
help to restrict consumption and encourage 
production. But did the market mechanism by 
any chance make prices rise spontaneously? 
For several decades the real price of petroleum 
followed a steady downward trend, although 
this was a resource approaching exhaustion. 
How do you account for this serious defect in 
the allocation of resources through the play of 
market laws? 
— The explanation seems very straightfor-
ward. Market laws have not operated freely, 
since competition has been very seriously re-
stricted. A few companies have dominated the 
market and have fixed unduly low prices. 
— What you say of the serious restrictions on 
competition is very true. But do you think that if 
there had been many fully competitive en-
terprises —as Adam Smith assumed—, that 
would have caused prices to rise? The oil com-
panies' own interests would have led them to 
expand production in order to increase their 
profits; subsequently, competition among 
them would have caused a price decline at the 
expense of their profit margins. So that con-
sumption would have increased even more in-
tensively, to the detriment of different sources 
of energy and with other highly regrettable 
consequences. Moreover, the producer coun-
tries had no power to protect the petroleum that 
was being squandered. 
— But you do recognize that the rise in prices 
will have the merit of reducing the rate of con-
sumption, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, encouraging the development of other 
forms of energy. 
— I recognize it fully. But take it into account 
that we are not speaking of prices spontane-
ously established by the operation of the 
market, but of deliberately determined prices 
which the producer countries have found 
themselves compelled to adopt as a counter-
measure to the serious situation that had been 
reached. 
Nor did the market show foresight with 
respect to the deterioration of the environment. 
The State has had to do what the play of market 
laws could not. It has had to impose restrictive 
measures which imply price increases, either 
because of the larger amount of capital re-
quired to prevent pollution, or owing to taxes of 
which the burden falls on prices. The problem 
now lies in the need for the social cost of all this 
to be equitably distributed. 
— The material discussed will give us much 
food for thought before we can form a defini-
tive opinion. In any case, we should like to 
maintain this same dialogue with respect to 
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the leaders of neoclassical theory. But you bypassing so eminent and forceful a neoclassi-
have spoken to us only of Milton Friedman, cist as Friedrich von Hayek. 
II 
The ideas of Friedrich von Hayek 
1. Their broad outlines 
— I was keeping in reserve the consideration 
of some of his ideas. I think the time has now 
come to discuss them, although later I shall 
invite you to revert to Professor Friedman. 
I have always followed with interest the 
prolific writings of Friedrich von Hayek, but on 
this occasion I shall refer only to a recent article 
entitled "The democratic ideal and the con-
tainment of power",8 since it represents a good 
summary of his political ideas, especially his 
defence of the liberal State in the original sense 
of the term, and of the principle of personal 
liberty which is inherent in it. 
As in the case of Milton Friedman's think-
ing, before embarking upon a dialogue: I 
should like us to reach an understanding as to 
the essential ideas of Von Hayek. 
First and foremost, it seems to me that un-
derlying these ideas, as in the preceding inst-
ance, is the fundamental concept of neoclassi-
cal theory. Remember that, according to this 
concept, when a régime of free competition is 
in full force, the incomes of individuals tend to 
be equated with their respective contributions 
to the production process. Such is the ethic 
underlying neoclassical reasoning. An ethic 
which is certainly very far from being put into 
practice in real life. 
Given this concept, any restriction of free 
competition is arbitrary, because it violates the 
principle of distributive justice, if I may be 
allowed to use my own terminology. Arbitrary, 
8
"E1 ideal democrático y la contención del poder", 
in Libertad y Leviatdn, Estudios Públicos, No. 1, Santiago, 
Chi le , Centro de Estudios Públicos, December 1980. This 
article is based on Friedrich von Hayek, Law, Legislation 
and Liberty, Vol. 3, The Political Order of a Free People, 
University of Chicago Press, 1979. Page numbers for quota-
t ions therefore refer to the original English text. 
too, any State intervention that transfers in-
come from some social groups to others, 
likewise violating market laws. Nothing what-
ever must be allowed to interfere with the 
market's role as supreme regulator of the 
economy. 
As we are apparently in agreement, I will 
continue with my interpretation, if you have no 
objections. From what I have just said very 
important conclusions may be deduced. It is 
necessary for the Constitution to set limits to 
the power of the legislative assemblies and also 
to the power of majorities, in order to avoid the 
violations aforesaid. 
An essentially democratic constitution 
—in the true meaning of this concept— lays 
down essential human rights as sacrosanct, and 
if a legislative majority does not respect them, it 
lapses into arbitrariness, into the most flagrant 
violation of the Constitution. 
Von Hayek defines arbitrariness as fol-
lows: "Arbitrary means... action determined by 
a particular will unrestrained by a general rule 
—irrespective of whether this will is the will of 
one or a majority. It is, therefore, not the agree-
ment of a majority on a particular action, nor 
even its conformity with a constitution, but 
only the willingness of a representative body to 
commit itself to the universal application of a 
rule which requires the particular action, that 
can be regarded as evidence that its members 
regard as just what they decide".9 
The same thing happens when a majority 
interferes with market laws. It would be a form 
of arbitrary action inconsistent with the princi-
ples hallowed by the Constitution. 
— Since you have von Hayek's article by you, 
will you please read us the relevant para-
9Friedrich von Hayek, op. cit., p . 8. 
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graphs? What is the source of the Constitu-
tion? Who approves it? 
— The Constitution is the expression of a col-
lective consensus, or, in the words of von 
Hayek, it is on "the consent of the people on 
which all power and the coherence of the State 
rest. Ifthat consent approves only of the laying 
down and enforcement of general rules of just 
conduct, and nobody is given power to coerce 
except for the enforcement of these rules (or 
temporarily during a violent disruption of order 
by some cataclysm), even the highest con-
stituted power may be limited. Indeed, the 
claim of Parliament to sovereingty at first 
meant only that it recognized no other will 
above it; it only gradually came to mean that it 
could do whatever it liked —which does not 
necessarily follow from the first, because the 
consent on which the unity of the State and 
therefore the power of any of its organs are 
founded may only restrain power but not confer 
positive power to act. 
"It is allegiance which creates power and 
the power thus created extends only so far as it 
has been extended by the consent of the 
people. It was because this was forgotten that 
the sovereignty of law became the same thing 
as the sovereignty of Parliament. And while the 
conception of the rule (reign, sovereignty or 
supremacy) of law presupposes a concept of 
law defined by the attributes of the rules, not by 
their source, today legislatures are no longer so 
called because they make the laws, but laws 
are so called because they emanate from legis-
latures, whatever the form or content of their 
resolutions."10 
Thus it is not a higher 'will' that limits 
power —von Hayek insists— but rather the 
consent of the people. 
That consent, on which the Constitution is 
based, has to limit the power of the legislative 
assemblies vis-á-vis the laws of the market. 
Thus, "all pressure on government to make it 
use its coercive powers to benefit particular 
groups is harmful to the generality". 
Let us see what these pressures consist of, 
especially, the pressure that can be exerted by 
large firms or corporations. 
l0Ibid., pp. 3-4. (Italics in the original text.) 
This pressure, however, is not comparable 
to the pressure of organized labour groups 
"which in most countries have been authorized 
by law or jurisdiction to use coercion to gain 
support for their policies. By conferring, for 
supposedly 'social reasons', on the trade unions 
unique privileges, which hardly government 
itself enjoys, organizations of workers have 
been enabled to exploit other workers by al-
together depriving them of the opportunity of 
good employment. Though this fact is conven-
tionally still ignored, the chief power of the 
trade unions rests today entirely on their being 
allowed to use power to prevent other workers 
from doing work they would wish to do".11 
But it is not only a question of restrictions 
on competition authorized by the legislative 
assemblies. There is also direct government 
interference with the distribution of income. 
On this subject, the distinguished professor 
says the following: 
"So long as it is legitimate for government 
to use force to effect a redistribution of material 
benefits —and this is the heart of socialism— 
there can be no curb on the rapacious instincts 
of all groups who want more for themselves. 
Once politics becomes a tug-of-war for shares 
in the income pie, decent government is impos-
sible. This requires that all use of coercion to 
assure a certain income to particular groups 
(beyond a flat minimum for all who cannot earn 
more in the market) be outlawed as immoral 
and strictly anti-social".12 
And further on he adds: "...once we give 
licence to the politicians to interfere in the 
spontaneous order of the market for the benefit 
of particular groups, they cannot deny such 
concessions to any group on which their sup-
port depends", which leads to "an ever-
growing domination over the economic process 
by politics".13 
And, again: "[.giving] general licence to 
politicians to grant special benefits to those 
whose support they need still must destroy that 
self-forming order of the market which serves 
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imposed order determined by some arbitrary 
human wills".14 
From all this we may draw a definitive and 
emphat ic conclusion: "In its present unlimited 
form, democracy has today largely lost the 
capacity of serving as a protection against ar-
bitrary power. It has ceased to be a safeguard of 
personal liberty, a restraint on the abuse of gov-
ernmental power which it was hoped it would 
prove to be when it was naively believed that, 
w h e n all power was made subject to demo-
cratic control, all the other restraints on govern-
mental power could be dispensed with. It has, 
on the contrary, become the main cause of a 
progressive and accelerating increase of the 
power and weight of the administrative 
machine".1 5 
All this leads to the progressive disintegra-
tion of the system and to "resort in despair to 
some type of dictatorial régime".16 
2. The arbitrariness of the surplus and 
the arbitrariness of redistribution 
— I will stop at this point to ask you: What do 
you think of all this? 
— We think Friedrich von Hayek's ideas are 
very logical, provided one starts from the pre-
mise you mentioned at the beginning, namely, 
the supreme regulatory role of the laws of the 
market. As we have just seen, if those laws are 
violated, the inevitable result is government 
by force. It is interesting to note that although 
you do not accept that premise concerning the 
laws of the market in your critique of 
peripheral capitalism, you arrive at a similar 
political conclusion. Are we right? 
— We will comment on the* last point later. 
With regard to your first remark, your interpre-
tation is correct. If we admit the validity of that 
premise, everything else falls into place. The 
problem is that that premise has absolutely no 
validity, however, as I will try to show when I 
refer to Friedman's thinking. 
It is worthwhile stressing this, as it is very 
important. Both authors hold that it is arbitrary 
to interfere with the laws of the market. But 
"Zfcid., p. 151. 
Klbid., p. 138. 
mhid.,\>. 152. 
they refuse to recognize the existence of the 
economic surplus and the fact of its appropria-
tion, particularly by those who have con-
centrated in their hands most of the means of 
production. In the light of neoclassical reason-
ing, both this appropriation and the fact that the 
surplus does not tend to be eliminated by the 
play of competition would be arbitrary. 
According to this interpretation of mine, 
the arbitrariness does not lie in the departures 
from the system, in the violation of the laws of 
the market, but rather is intrinsic in the system 
itself, in a system whose dynamics depend 
fundamentally on the need for the surplus to 
grow constantly instead of on that euthanasia 
which would occur if neoclassical reasoning 
were carried to its conclusion. 
— How do you explain the fact that this 
phenomenon is not taken into account? 
— In my long life I have seen brilliant men 
hold stubbornly to certain dogmas. I would say 
that the more brilliant they are, the more stub-
bornly they hold to their dogmas, and the more 
extreme their dialectic becomes as they seek to 
assert the absolute truth they believe they pos-
sess. Please do not forget, also, that the so-
called science of economics is very new by 
comparison with other scientific disciplines. 
But let us get back to the main thread of our 
discussion. 
— We think that is a very good idea. We said a 
moment ago that, despite your fundamental 
differences with Friedrich von Hayek, you 
reach a similar conclusion when you hold that, 
if we have understood you correctly, in the 
advanced stage of the structural changes in the 
system, there is a tendency towards the 
dictatorial use of force. 
— That is indeed the case. But please wait a 
moment before we come to this extremely 
significant point. I would like to stress a great 
difference between the reasoning of our 
neoclassical author and my own, as I stopped 
being a neoclassicist a long time ago. 
According to von Hayek, the disturbances 
in the system, as regards the distribution of 
income, are due to the fact that there are social 
groups that interfere with the play of the laws of 
the market in order to appropriate for 
themselves what other groups have obtained in 
l ine whith their contribution to the productive 
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process. For me, however, the problem begins 
earlier, that is to say, when certain social groups 
appropriate for themselves the fruits of the 
technical progress that should have been dis-
tr ibuted among all according to their produc-
tive contribution. 
— / / we have understood you correctly, you 
hold that there are privileged social groups 
that appropriate for themselves the fruits of 
the productivity of the system and prevent 
those fruits from being distributed according 
to the rationale of the laws of the market that 
the neoclassical economists assume to exist. 
— Your interpretation could not be more cor-
rect. And at the risk of repeating myself, I might 
say that the arbitrariness of that primary ap-
propriation is followed by the arbitrariness of 
redistribution in the play of power relations. 
And since there is no regulating principle 
whatsoever in this struggle for distribution the 
system thus moves towards its crisis. 
— We would like you to explain us, however, 
why this trend towards crisis has not occurred 
before in the development of peripheral 
capitalism. 
— I will try to do so. The tendency to move 
towards crisis is a consequence of the structural 
changes that occur in the system as the technol-
ogy oí the centres is adopted. There are 
structural phases in which the redistributive 
power of the labour force is either non-existent 
or very weak because the process of democrati-
zation —I am talking about genuine, not appa-
rent or manipulated democratization— is only 
incipient. Well, as this process continues, the 
labour force acquires the power to share the 
successive increments of productivity and to 
compensate itself for taxes and other burdens 
imposed by a State that is running to fat, for the 
reasons I have explained. And when this in-
creasingly antagonistic struggle makes it im-
possible to continue meeting the dynamic re-
qu i rement that the surplus must grow con-
stantly, this gives rise to the crisis and the in-
flationary spiral that upsets the system. 
3, Apparent analogies and great differences 
— That is exactly what we were saying: you 
reach a conclusion similar to von Hayek's. 
— Similar, yes, but for a very diffeient reason. 
Because for von Hayek the crisis is due in the 
final analysis to the fact that abuse by the demo-
cratic majority has violated the laws of the mar-
ket. Whereas I hold that the crisis is due to 
a system that is vitiated from the beginning 
because it does not allow the laws of the market 
to play the redistributive role attributed to 
them. 
— Now we understand. But what would be the 
consequences of two concepts that, despite 
their being so different, and so divergent in 
their significance, would seem to lead inevit-
ably to the same outcome? 
— I will try to answer that very important 
question. For von Hayek and Friedman, there 
must be a constitutional limitation to prevent 
restrictions on competition, whether from com-
binations of enterprises or from trade unions, 
and at the same time to prevent arbitrary trans-
fers of income between the social groups. In 
contrast, I propose a transformation in the 
system of accumulation and distribution. 
— Before you expand on that, please allow me 
a slight digression. You have not commented 
on a statement made by von Hayek (and also by 
Friedman) to the effect that the trade unions, 
by arbitrarily setting wages, prevent the emp-
loyment of other workers. 
— This idea is being widely disseminated 
nowadays in certain articles written by neoclas-
sicists. According to them, unemployment is to 
be explained by the artificial increase in wages 
achieved by the trade unions. These wages 
should really be as low as is necessary in order 
to achieve a balance between the supply and 
demand of labour. Let us suppose that is so. 
Nevertheless, this reasoning leaves out a very 
important matter. If wages go down, according 
to the laws of the market prices would have to 
go down as well. But I believe I have shown 
you that prices do not go down, but rather that 
the surplus goes up. These phenomena cannot 
be explained without taking into account the 
social structure. 
— You were referring to certain constitu-
tional limitations which, according to von 
Hayek, should ensure the free play of the laws 
of the market. What would those limitations 
be? 
— First of all, limitations to prevent combina-
tions of enterprises and workers. Then, limita-
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tions to prevent State expenditures from going 
above a certain proportion of the global pro-
duct, in order to check the arbitrary transfer of 
income decided upon by the parliamentary ma-
jorities. And, finally, a negative tax or subsidy 
to alleviate the fate of those who have very low 
incomes, either because of their small con-
tribution to the productive process or for some 
other morally acceptable reason. 
— These proposals are perfectly understand-
able in the light of neoclassical principles. But 
since we are beginning to follow your train of 
thought, we assume you have objections to 
them. 
— I most certainly do. We are still leaving out 
the structural surplus. Please recall what I said 
before. T h e fact that prices do not go down as 
productivity goes up is not due to combinations 
of enterprises, but rather to the mechanism of 
appropriation of the surplus that prevents the 
fruits of productivity obtained through compet-
ition from being spread throughout the society. 
Combinations change the internal distribution 
of the surplus, but do not affect the amount of 
surplus there is. 
T h e dissolution of trade-union power, 
however, would bring about an increase in the 
rate of growth of the surplus. If this phenome-
non were accompanied by a spontaneous pro-
cess of reduction in prices as long as remunera-
tions were not increased, we would have no 
objection. But we know very well that the 
system does not work that way, at all. 
It is true that accumulation could increase 
if the surplus increased this way as a result of 
the elimination of trade-union power or the 
limitation of State expenditure. And that could 
have a positive effect in certain phases of de-
velopment . But if, on the contrary, the surplus 
increased in this way was devoted to consump-
tion, what would happen then? 
— That is just what we wanted to say. In order 
for the limitations advocated by our neoclassi-
cal authors to have positive dynamic effects, it 
would also be necessary to limit privileged 
consumption. What are your views on this 
point? 
4. The social use of the surplus 
— Now I see that ypu are on the right track. It is 
necessary to limit privileged consumption in 
order to increase accumulation and stimulate 
the absorption capacity of the system: this 
would be the best way to achieve a dynamic 
distribution of income. But clearly, there 
would also have to be a certain direct redis-
tribution of income, particularly at the expense 
of privileged consumption: to use Dr. 
Fr iedman's term, a negative tax. 
All this, however, cannot be conceived as a 
series of piecemeal and disconnected mea-
sures. They have to be part of a rational concept 
of the social use of the surplus. 
— We must interrupt you in order to ask a very 
important question. Will it be necessary to 
transfer to the State the ownership and man-
agement of the means of production in order to 
achieve the purpose you have just stated? 
— No, absolutely not. This view has quite 
wrongly been attributed to me. It is the very 
enterprises from which the surplus comes 
which should distribute it, through accumula-
tion, redistributive improvements and State ex-
pendi ture , by compressing that part of the surp-
lus that is devoted to excessive consumption or 
excessive transfers abroad. 
— Are you proposing that the enterprises 
should perform this very important role at 
their own discretion? 
— Not at all. The enterprises would merely be 
responsible for implementing the social use of 
the surplus. The decision must come from a 
broad consensus, a consensus enshrined in the 
Constitution in order to prevent the enterprises 
from disposing arbitrarily of the surplus. As you 
see, my view on the constitutional consensus is 
based on Friedrich von Hayek's idea: a con-
sensus establishing the general principles that 
will guide the social use of the surplus. The 
legislative majorities would have to follow 
these guidelines in their specific decisions, but 
they would not be able to change them. Any 
change would have to be made through a con-
stitutional ammendment. I have tried to exp-
lain all this in my book, so please do not ask me 
to go into it in depth now. 
— Very well, but let us mention one point that 
has great political significance. You speak of a 
consensus enshrined in the Constitution and 
say that you are inspired by von Hayek in this. 
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5. Changes in the structure of power 
— There is, of course, a coincidence of views 
as to the procedure, but not as to the objective. 
My objective is fundamentally different from 
that proposed by von Hayek. In order to 
achieve what this economist wants, it would be 
necessary to make a regressive change in the 
structure of power that would clearly be detri-
mental to the labour force. To provide for the 
social use of the surplus, on the other hand, it is 
necessary to make a progressive change in the 
structure of power that is detrimental to those 
who appropriate and retain a considerable 
proportion of the surplus. 
— You speak of a regressive change in the 
structure of power that is detrimental to work-
ers in the broadest sense. How is this related 
with your views about the use of force to deal 
with the crisis of the system? 
— Actually, it amounts to two different ways of 
saying the same thing. I said before that when 
the workers have acquired great trade-union 
and political power, the crisis cannot be solved 
with a restrictive monetary policy. A rise in 
prices cannot be avoived, only mitigated at 
best, and there is a contraction of the economy 
and unemployment, The force is used to over-
come the trade-union and political power of the 
workers. I call this a regressive change in the 
structure of power. 
— This would seem to lead to a very serious 
political outcome. Is there not some alterna-
tive to the use of force in order to induce work-
ers to accept the unrestricted rule of the laws 
of the market? 
— Well, I must say quite frankly that I have 
reached the conclusion that there is no such 
alternative. Would you be willing to advise the 
workers not to use their redistributive power in 
order to ensure the continued growth of the 
economic surplus in the hands of the upper 
strata? 
— Well, we might feel able to give this advice 
if at the same time a limit was placed on 
privileged consumption, in order to increase 
accumulation and improve distribution. What 
would you say to that? 
— You must bear in mind that this limitation of 
consumption, in order to be effective, would 
require the progressive change in the structure 
of power which I mentioned before. What hap-
pens , however, is that when force is used to 
solve the crisis of the system, trade-union and 
political power is suppressed without any mea-
sures being taken to limit privileged consump-
tion. On the contrary, trade-union and political 
power is suppressed in order to restore the 
dynamics of the surplus. And this gives new 
impetus to privileged consumption. 
— Is it not conceivable that the upper strata 
would spontaneously, under the protection of 
a régime of force, limit their consumption and 
increase their coefficient of accumulation 
without any coercion at all? 
— Yes, it is conceivable, as you say. If that 
were the case, the dynamic capacity of the 
system would improve, although at the great 
social and political cost implicit in a régime of 
force. Please take a look at the facts, at the 
specific cases, and see what happens in such 
instances. 
— So you do not deny the possibility that the 
restoration of the dynamic capacity of the sur-
plus might allow for the achievement of a 
satisfactory rate of development and the elimi-
nation of inflation under a régime of force? 
— I do not deny it. For that to happen, there 
would have to be a coherent and systematic 
policy, and the conclusive proof that such a 
policy was being followed would be the growth 
of the rate of accumulation at the expense of 
privileged consumption in order to achieve a 
progressive improvement of employment and 
distribution. I also believe that it would be 
possible to contain social inflation. 
— But could those and other dynamic objec-
tives really be achieved? We would like your 
frank opinion. 
— I bel ieve they could, if that were really the 
objective. Looking at the facts, however, I am 
convinced that once the dynamics of the sur-
plus is restored to the benefit of the upper strata 
and to the detriment of the labour force, infla-
tion becomes tolerable once again to the do-
minant social groups, regardless of whether it 
comes from internal or external factors. And if 
to that we add the fact that there is no decisive 
stimulus to the economy and in some cases 
there is an increase in unemployment, doesn't 
it seem to you that the use of force will inevit-
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ably bring about tremendous frustration? A tre-
mendous feeling of frustration among all those 
who have sincerely believed in the effective-
ness of the laws of the market, but not among 
those who have increased their economic 
power extraordinarily: they praise the freedom 
they have enjoyed to do so, which is incompati-
b le with the freedom of others. 
1. Protection and subsidy 
— In order to keep the sequence of our dialo-
gue, I had suggested we comment on von 
Hayek's ideas and then pick up the thread 
again. Now is the time to do that. 
We at CEPAL have always been con-
cerned about a certain latent tendency on the 
per iphery towards external imbalance. It is 
t rue that Dr. Friedman does not particularly 
consider the imbalance at the periphery, but 
rather that which occasionally occurs in the 
centres . He feels, however, that this is no 
reason to resort to measures involving inter-
vention. 
H e holds that the commercial imbalance 
brought about by external factors is corrected 
spontaneously by the play of the rates of ex-
change. I have his book here, and to avoid con-
fusion, let me read the relevant paragraphs. He 
says the following: 
"Suppose that, to begin with, 360 yen 
equal a dollar. At this exchange rate, the actual 
rate of exchange for many years, suppose that 
the Japanese can produce and sell everything 
for fewer dollars than we can in the United 
States: TV sets, automobiles, steel, and even 
soybeans, wheat, milk and ice-cream. If we had 
free international trade, we would try to buy all 
our goods from Japan. This would seem to be 
the extreme horror story of the kind depicted by 
defenders of tariffs —we would be flooded with 
Japanese goods and could sell them nothing. 
"Before throwing up your hands in horror, 
carry the analysis one step further. How would 
This is what neither Friedman nor von 
Hayek recognize. They do not want to acknowl-
edge that neoclassical principles can only 
be applied under a régime of force. Do you 
accept the idea that economic freedom can be 
imposed by suppressing political freedom? 
Will there be a constitutional consensus for 
that? 
we pay the Japanese? We would offer them 
dollar bills. What would they do with the dollar 
bills? We have assumed that at 360 yen to the 
dollar everything is cheaper in Japan, so there 
is nothing in the United States market that they 
would want to buy. If the Japanese exporters 
were willing to burn or bury the dollar bills, 
that would be wonderful for us. We would get 
all kinds of goods for green pieces of paper that 
we can produce in great abundance and very 
cheaply. We would have the most marvelous 
export industry conceivable. 
"Of course, the Japanese would not in fact 
sell us useful goods in order to get useless 
pieces of paper to bury or burn. Like us, they 
want to get something real in return for their 
work. If all goods were cheaper in Japan than in 
the United States at 360 yen to the dollar, the 
exporters would try to get rid of their dollars, 
would try to sell them for 360 yen to the dollar 
in order to buy the cheaper Japanese goods. But 
who would be willing to buy the dollars? What 
is true for the Japanese exporter is true for 
everyone in Japan. No one will be willing to 
give 360 yen in exchange for one dollar if 360 
yen will buy more of everything in Japan than 
one dollar will buy in the United States. The 
exporters, on discovering that no one will buy 
their dollars at 360 yen, will offer to take fewer 
yen for a dollar. The price of the dollar in terms 
of yen will go down —to 300 yen for a dollar, or 
250 yen, or 200 yen. Put the other way around, 
it will take more and more dollars to buy a given 
number of Japanese yen. Japanese goods are 
priced in yen, so their price in dollars will go 
III 
Back to Dr. Friedman 
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up. Conversely, United States goods are priced 
in dollars, so the more dollars the Japanese get 
for a given number of yen, the cheaper United 
States goods become to the Japanese in terms 
ofyen. 
"The price of the dollar in terms of yen 
would fall until, on the average, the dollar va-
lue of goods that the Japanese buy from the 
United States roughly equaled the dollar value 
of goods that the United States buys from Ja-
pan. At that price everybody who wanted to 
buy yen for dollars would find someone who 
was willing to sell him yen for dollars."17 
— Here again, we have a reasoning that is very 
attractive because of its simplicity. The market 
solves the imbalance by itself without there 
being any need for State intervention. Now we 
would like to know what you think about it. 
— In looking at this question, let us take as our 
point of departure several indisputable facts; 
all connected with the periphery. First, 
economic development brings with it a heavy 
growth of demand, particularly for industrial 
goods. Second, primary exports from the 
periphery are inadequate to cover the cost of 
meeting this demand, save in exceptional 
cases: that is why industrialization is an inevit-
able requirement of development. And, third, 
industrialization is also essential to absorb the 
great mass of the labour force that cannot be 
employed in primary production, either for 
domestic consumption or for export. And the 
more technology penetrates into primary pro-
duction, the greater the need for industrializa-
tion will be. 
If you do not object to our using this point 
of departure, let us continue our argument. 
To satisfy this demand, there are only two 
possibilities and a combination of the two: one 
of them consists of developing domestic pro-
duction of industrial goods with technologies 
that are already available to us and exporting 
part of these goods in order to import other 
industrial goods that we cannot manufacture 
because of the sophisticated technology in-
volved or because we do not have the natural 
resources necessary to do so. This would be 
industrialization with extensive opening up to 
the outside. 
l7Milton and Rose Friedman, op. cit., pp. 41-43. 
The other possibility would be to stress 
production for the domestic market through im-
port substitution rather than industrial exports. 
Which would you prefer? 
— We think the first possibility would be bet-
ter, because it would allow us to gain the well-
recognized advantages of trade. 
— So do I: I agree with you and we will come 
back to that later. For the moment, I would like 
to mention the differences between the indus-
trial costs of the centre and those of the 
periphery that result from the technical and 
economic superiority of the centre, on which I 
will also expand in a while. 
This is also an indisputable fact. The high-
er costs of industrialization in the periphery 
represent a considerable obstacle, whether it 
is a question of exporting industrial goods 
in competition with goods from the centres, or 
of producing them domestically also in compe-
tition .with goods from the centres. Do you 
agree? 
— Of course. These facts exist independently 
of any theoretical consideration. Please 
continue. 
— Very well, for Dr. Friedman the solution is 
right at hand. If, as the result of higher costs, 
exports are lower and imports are higher than 
they should be and there is an imbalance, this 
will correct itself because it will bring about 
monetary devaluation, which will lower the 
cost of exports and raise the cost of imports 
without any need for State intervention. 
— That would undoubtedly be a logical conse-
quence of Friedman's theory. 
— If we think it over, we can see that the im-
mediate effects of devaluation would be similar 
to the effects of protection or subsidy, so why 
should we object to protection in order to make 
possible domestic production by defending it 
from exccesive imports? And why object to a 
subsidy that would be equivalent to protection 
in order to promote exports? Frankly, I prefer 
the latter and I am going to explain why. I 
suspect, however, that you are inclined to agree 
with Dr. Friedman. 
— We will reserve judgement until we hear 
your argument. 
— Here are my objections. Devaluation not 
only cheapens exports of industrial goods that 
are not competitive, it also cheapens primary 
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exports that are competitive. This means a loss 
of income for the country concerned, particu-
larly in the case of very sensitive products, 
whe re the increased supply would be ac-
companied by a drop in prices that would 
wholly or partially wipe out the increased 
value of exports, or even exceed it. 
— Let us interrupt for a moment. The propo-
nents of devaluation suggest a tax on exports of 
competitive goods in order to avoid this 
adverse effect. Non-competitive goods, how-
ever, would be favoured by devaluation. 
— You must consider, however, that the tax 
would not be a spontaneous result of the play of 
the market, but rather a deliberate State action. 
It would be reverse protection, so to speak. I 
will continue stating my objections. 
Devaluation means changing the entire in-
ternal system ofcosts and prices; protection, on 
the other hand, would have much more limited 
effects internally, and the lower the coefficient 
of foreign trade with respect to the global pro-
duct of the economy, the more limited these 
effects would be. 
Finally, this disturbance of costs and 
prices is translated into an overall increase in 
prices, bringing with it the need for a series of 
readjustments, which will eventually bring ab-
out another devaluation because the short-term 
effects I mentioned will have been lost. 
— Then you are against devaluation. 
— Let me explain. I am against this type of 
devaluation and I do not hesitate to say that I 
prefer protection or an equivalent subsidy, pro-
vided it is moderate and not abusive, as often 
happens . 
But I am not against devaluation; on the 
contrary, I consider it absolutely necessary 
w h e n it is a question of adjusting the external 
value of the currency to an inflationary rise in 
domestic prices in excess of international 
pr ices . I t is well known that over-valuation 
causes serious imbalances, as it holds back ex-
ports and excessively encourages imports, to 
the detr iment of domestic production and 
employment . 
— You already expressed your preference for 
industrialization oriented more towards ex-
ports than towards import substitution. We 
also prefer this course, as we have already said. 
— That is indeed so. But whether or not we are 
able to pursue this preference depends not 
only on the decision taken by our countries, but 
also to a large extent, on the decisions of the 
advanced countries. Those countries have 
nei ther promoted the industrialization of the 
periphery in the past nor have they subse-
quently favoured this area's industrial exports. 
2. The centripetal nature of advanced 
capitalism 
— Are you saying that this attitude has been 
intentional? 
— I do not attribute an evil intent to those 
countries, but rather I believe this situation is 
the consequence of the centripetal nature of 
advanced capitalism. This is a very significant 
fact which must be stressed. Industrialization 
has developed in those countries over a very 
long period, and their constant technological 
innovations have brought about an enormous 
increase in productivity. But the fruit of this 
productivity has remained in the centres 
themselves and has not been disseminated 
through the periphery by means of a drop in 
prices. And regardless of how this fruit has 
been distributed socially, it has remained in 
the centres themselves, it is there that demand 
has increased, and this increasing demand has 
stimulated innovation and industrial devel-
opment. 
During the course of this centripetal pro-
cess, industry could not have reached the 
periphery spontaneously. It was not until the 
crises in the centres —the First World War, the 
Great Depression, the Second World War— 
that industrialization became essential in order 
to provide substitutes for what could not be 
imported. Consequently, substitution was not 
the outcome of a doctrinal preference, but was 
imposed by adverse external circumstances. 
And since the centres had progressed consider-
ably in their technology and their capital ac-
cumulation, the periphery began its in-
dustrialization with an obvious handicap. 
Hence the greater costs, which make necessary 
protection and subsidy. And although this 
handicap is being overcome with regard to cer-
tain goods, it is still there with regard to others 
because of the constant technological innova-
tions being developed in the centres. 
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— But later this whole panorama changed 
and it became possible to export. 
— That is quite true, particularly during the 
long years of prosperity of the centres, which 
went on to the mid-1970s. Some Latin Ameri-
can countries took advantage of these favour-
able conditions and achieved fantastic results. 
They followed a policy of subsidies and diffe-
rent forms of export promotion. They violated 
the laws of the market! Even today, even with 
the centres in the midst of their crises these 
policies are still producing positive results. 
— Do you believe countries should go to ex-
treme lengths to promote exports and abandon 
the policy of import substitution? 
— We are talking about two aspects of the 
same problem. It is necessary to stimulate ex-
ports while at the same time continuing to de-
velop the domestic market through substitu-
tion. In my opinion, it is inconceivable that the 
centres should open their doors without restric-
tion to everything we might need to export in 
order to meet the growing needs for imports 
required by development. 
Moreover, this amazing increase and di-
versification of exports of manufactured goods 
has been achieved thanks to the industries 
created previously as part of the process of im-
port substitution. 
— You suggest a combination of both mea-
sureSy then. But in what proportions should 
they be combined? Which should be em-
phasized more: exports or substitution? 
— That is a good question. I believe the ans-
wer depends to a large extent on the attitude of 
the advanced countries. You know quite well 
that there are in these countries strong pro-
tectionist trends which are encouraged by un-
employment, as well as by their centripetal 
tendencies. The centres are not following Dr. 
Friedman's advice at all, and have no intention 
of tearing down all the trade restrictions that 
hold back exports from the periphery. It is not 
merely a question of new restrictions, but 
rather of other very significant ones that started 
long ago, such as the establishment of sliding 
scales of customs duties: very low duties or no 
duty at all for imports of raw materials, with 
duties on processed materials that go up ac-
cording to the degree of processing in the 
periphery. 
— We cannot help being surprised by what 
you havç just said, as we thought that a policy 
of ample liberalization of imports had been 
agreed during the Kennedy Round and the To-
kyo Round. 
— That is indeed true, But this policy is con-
cerned primarily with the trade of the centres. 
It is to a large extent concerned with goods 
where the constant technological innovations 
of the centres are very evident —goods that are 
increasingly sophisticated and capital-inten-
sive. This is a clear manifestation of the 
centripetal nature of advanced capitalism. 
Once more, the periphery is to a large extent 
left out, as it had been before with regard to 
industrialization. 
In contrast, liberalization has not extended 
to the less sophisticated manufactured goods 
that the periphery has learned or is learning to 
export. If that liberalization occurred, it would 
be extremely advantageous for our develop-
ment as well as for the centres, as we would 
import more from them, with the advantages 
resulting from a rational division of labour. 
And here you have the answer to your pre-
vious question. The rational combination of 
measures to encourage exports and substitute 
imports depends fundamentally on the degree 
of liberalization to be found in the centres, 
These are not good years, because of the crisis 
the centres are undergoing, but it would be a 
serious mistake to weaken our export efforts 
and to falter in the struggle to get the centres to 
change their restrictive policies. 
— / / we have understood you correctly, the 
inore restrictive the centres are, the more the 
periphery will have to stress substitution? 
— Correct. Not substitution in watertight com-
partments, however, but rather in broader 
markets through reciprocal trade. Otherwise, it 
would be too costly because of the type of 
goods that have to be substituted. 
— Aren't you concerned about this cost? Isn't 
there some way of eliminating it? 
— Of course I am concerned, just as much as 
you are. Export subsidies involve a cost, as do 
taxes on imports. We must try to ensure that the 
cost is as low as possible. 
Think about the fact, however, that this is 
the cost we must pay in the present stage of 
development in order to achieve more inten-
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sive growth. There is a net gain, since the in-
crease in the global product of the economy is 
much greater than this cost. 
— You have just referred to the present 
stage of development, which makes us think 
you consider this factor to be transitory. Is that 
so? 
— You have interpreted my words correctly. 
At present, our countries would not be able to 
swim in the strong current of the industrial 
trade of the centres. But as they acquire techno-
logical capabilities and accumulate more capi-
tal, they will gradually be able to do so. We 
must go through certain stages in our industria-
lization. Development policies must be aimed 
at accelerating the process. And, above all, we 
must not fall into dogmatic positions. 
— What do you mean by that? 
— I mean the Friedmanist dogma that opposes 
subsidies and protection. Under that dogma, 
some solid industries are being torn down and a 
longstanding industrialization effort is being 
destroyed. 
I will end this dialogue here, for the time 
being, because I believe we must continue it 
and we must counteract the penetration of 
ideologies which have serious implications for 
Latin American development. We have an in-
escapable responsibility to do so. In this case 
we are not talking about just one of the many 
episodes of intellectual dissemination from the 
centres. This is clearly a phenomenon of delib-
erate propagation. Visits, interviews and con-
ferences, ardently supported by a free-spend-
ing and well-organized campaign in the mass 
media. There is more, much more, behind this 
that pure apostolic zeal. This is a systematic 
effort to turn back the clock, and it represents a 
tremendous step backwards intellectually, just 
at a time when we had managed to move for-
ward, with great difficulty, in interpreting La-
tin American development. 
Over thirty years ago, we demonstrated the 
falseness of that long-past scheme of interna-
tional division of labour, to which neoclassical 
theoreticians would now have us return. And in 
the name of economic freedom they would 
justify sacrificing political freedom. 
Let Milton Friedman understand! Let 
Friedrich von Hayek also understand! A ge-
nuine process of democratization was moving 
forward in our Latin America, with great diffi-
culty and frequent delays. But its incompatibil-
ity with the system of accumulation and distri-
bution of income is leading towards crisis. And 
crisis brings about an interruption in the pro-
cess and the suppression of political freedom: 
just the right conditions for promoting the unre-
stricted play of the laws of the market. What a 
paradox you involve! You praise political free-
dom and individual rights. But don't you 
realize that in these lands of the periphery, 
your preaching can only bear fruit through the 
suppression of that freedom and the violation of 
those rights? A tremendous paradox and a tre-
mendous historical responsibility. Because, 
not only do the ideologies you preach per-
petuate and aggravate social inequalities, they 
also conspire flagrantly against the effort that 
must be made to reach new forms of understand-
ing and articulation between North and 
South. The damage you are doing with your 
dogma is immeasurable! 
